MEASURING THE INFLUENCE OF TASK COMPLEXITY ON HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITY: AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION  by PODOFILLINI, LUCA et al.
MEASURING THE INFLUENCE OF TASK COMPLEXITY ON
HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITY: AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
LUCA PODOFILLINI1*, JINKYUN PARK2, and VINH N. DANG1
1Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), Switzerland; 
2Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Republic of Korea
*Corresponding author. E-mail : luca.podofillini@psi.ch
Received March 12, 2013
1. INTRODUCTION
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) aims at analyzing
human errors in technological systems, the influences on
human performance, and ultimately assessing the so-called
Human Error Probability (HEP). HRA results, often in
the context of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA)
results, inform operating as well as regulatory decisions
with important safety and economic consequences. This
calls for the need to use, in HRA like in any other areas of
risk analysis, methods and tools that, to the extent possible,
are built from and validated on empirical evidence. Recent
efforts in this direction are the International HRA Empirical
Study [1, 2] and the follow-up US HRA Empirical Study
[3]; these studies were aimed at evaluating HRA methods’
strengths and weaknesses against evidence from operating
crew performance data, collected during simulated accident
scenarios. Also, recognizing the need for enhancing the
empirical basis of HRA methods, programs of HRA data
collection from simulated environments are active or are
being activated all over the world [4].
In parallel to the collection of data, the growing interest
in enhancing the empirical basis of HRA is visible in the
development of HRA methods with underlying models
directly built from data (where the models represent quan-
titative relationships between the human error probability
and factors influencing it, often referred to as Performance
Shaping Factors, PSFs) [5, 6]. Further, methods are being
developed to validate the relationships among PSFs and
the error probability, e.g., in the already mentioned HRA
empirical studies [1-3] and in [7-11]. In particular, in [7],
it is investigated whether the complexity of procedure-
guided tasks (by the operating crew of nuclear power
plants in emergency situations) can be quantitatively and
objectively measured with the use of TACOM (TAsk
COMplexity) measure [12]. TACOM evaluates a com-
plexity score by combining the contributions of five differ-
ent task complexity aspects (e.g., amount of information to
be processed, logical complexity of tasks, and knowledge
requirements).
Besides the lack of reference HRA data, one of the
A key input for the assessment of Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) with Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods is
the evaluation of the factors influencing the human performance (often referred to as Performance Shaping Factors, PSFs). In
general, the definition of these factors and the supporting guidance are such that their evaluation involves significant subjectivity.
This affects the repeatability of HRA results as well as the collection of HRA data for model construction and verification. In
this context, the present paper considers the TAsk COMplexity (TACOM) measure, developed by one of the authors to quantify
the complexity of procedure-guided tasks (by the operating crew of nuclear power plants in emergency situations), and evaluates
its use to represent (objectively and quantitatively) task complexity issues relevant to HRA methods. In particular, TACOM
scores are calculated for five Human Failure Events (HFEs) for which empirical evidence on the HEPs (albeit with large
uncertainty) and influencing factors are available – from the International HRA Empirical Study. The empirical evaluation
has shown promising results. The TACOM score increases as the empirical HEP of the selected HFEs increases. Except for one
case, TACOM scores are well distinguished if related to different difficulty categories (e.g., “easy” vs. “somewhat difficult”),
while values corresponding to tasks within the same category are very close. Despite some important limitations related to the
small number of HFEs investigated and the large uncertainty in their HEPs, this paper presents one of few attempts to empirically
study the effect of a performance shaping factor on the human error probability. This type of study is important to enhance
the empirical basis of HRA methods, to make sure that 1) the definitions of the PSFs cover the influences important for HRA
(i.e., influencing the error probability), and 2) the quantitative relationships among PSFs and error probability are adequately
represented.
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challenges for building empirically-based and validated
HRA models is an objective evaluation of the performance
influences (in HRA terms, the PSF ratings). Typically,
these factors characterize the personnel performance in
specific tasks by addressing the personnel directly (e.g., via
the quality of their training, experience, and work processes),
the task to be performed (e.g., the time required to complete
the actions and the quality of procedural guidance), the
available tools (e.g., the quality of human machine interface),
and other aspects depending on the specific HRA method.
Indeed, the application of current HRA methods is largely
based on subjective evaluations (coming in at different
stages of the analysis and to different extents, depending
on the specific method and analyst knowledge/experience).
On the one hand this influences the repeatability of HRA
results (this issue is deeply investigated in the US HRA
Empirical Study [3]). On the other hand, this challenges
the empirical derivation and validation of the quantitative
relationships among PSFs and HEPs, which ideally would
require the availability of data points, collected for perfor-
mance conditions corresponding to many different combi-
nations of PSF ratings. The lack of objective PSF evalua-
tions prejudices the establishment of a direct link between
collected data and the associated PSF ratings, because of
the need to subjectively interpret the data. For some of the
PSFs typically considered by HRA methods, especially
those aimed at characterizing crew behaviors (e.g., in the
SPAR-H method: level of stress, fitness for duty, and work
processes [13]), some (relatively high) level of subjectivity
is probably unavoidable in the evaluation of these factors,
due to the inherent variability of the effects of these factors
on the error probability. However, there is still a substantial
margin to improve on the PSF definitions and guidance
to decrease subjectivity, as underscored by the results of
the HRA Empirical Studies [1, 3].
In an effort to provide objective PSF measures, the
present paper investigates the use of the TACOM measure
to represent (objectively and quantitatively) the task com-
plexity issues relevant to HRA methods. In previous works
by one of the authors, TACOM scores have been compared
with three types of crew performance indicators: the time
to complete the task [12]; subjective workload scores as
measured by the NASA-TLX (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration – Task Load indeX) [14]; and the
OPAS (Operator Performance Assessment System)
scores developed by HAMMLAB (HAlden Man Machine
LABoratory) of the OECD Halden Reactor Project [15].
It was shown that the TACOM scores and these human
performance data have significant correlations; this supports
TACOM measure as a relevant indicator of task complexity
influences on crew performance. However, to evaluate the
relevance of TACOM for HRA purposes, the relationship
with the error probability needs to be investigated. First,
qualitatively this requires that the TACOM definition
should include the complexity elements that influence the
human error probability. Second, quantitatively, TACOM
scores should correlate with the error probabilities (the
profile of the other PSFs being kept constant or their effect
being properly considered, e.g., averaged out or factored
out). To this end, in this paper, the TACOM measure is
applied to multiple emergency tasks of different complexity,
for which empirical evidence of the error probability is
available (albeit with large uncertainty). In particular,
Human Failure Events (HFEs) from the International HRA
Empirical Study are selected [2]. In the context of the
Empirical Study, pre-defined emergency tasks were simu-
lated, obtaining evidence on the error probability and on
the performance influencing factors on the corresponding
HFEs. In the present paper, the TACOM scores are con-
trasted to the empirical evidence with the goal to evaluate
both the correlation between the actual TACOM scores and
the empirical HEPs of the considered HFEs. In addition, the
paper investigates whether TACOM provides a difficulty
characterization coherent with the empirical evidence (in
other words, the ability to discriminate between, e.g., “easy”
and “difficult” tasks).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, a brief
explanation of the TACOM measure is given. Then, the
evaluation methodology applied in the present paper is
described (Section 3). Section 4 presents the empirical basis
of the evaluation: the data from the International HRA
Empirical Study [2]. The results of the evaluation are given
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 includes concluding remarks
along with summarizing the limitations of the study. 
2. THE TACOM MEASURE
According to wide-spread operating experience in many
industries (such as nuclear power plants, chemical plants, or
aviation industries) that are based on large process control
systems, it is evident that human error is one of the crucial
contributors to serious accidents as well as incidents. In
addition, the use of well-designed procedures is one of the
practical options to reduce the possibility of human error
[16]. 
One challenging aspect for the performance of tasks
prescribed in emergency procedures is the need to cope
with dynamically varying situations by using static task
descriptions (i.e. the procedures). In following the emer-
gency procedures, operators have to continuously assess
the nature of the situation at hand in order to confirm the
appropriateness of their response. It can be reasonably
expected that the possibility of human error will increase
when operators are faced with complex tasks. In this regard,
one of the critical questions to be resolved is: “How complex
a task is?” The TACOM measure has been developed to
give a quantitative answer [12]. The TACOM measure is
defined by a weighted Euclidean norm in a complexity
space that consists of three dimensions, suggested by [17].
These dimensions are: task scope (TS), task structurability
(TS), and task uncertainty (TU), each comprised of one
152 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.2  APRIL 2013
PODOFILLINI et al., Measuring the Influence of Task Complexity on Human Error Probability: An Empirical Evaluation
153NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.2  APRIL 2013
PODOFILLINI et al., Measuring the Influence of Task Complexity on Human Error Probability: An Empirical Evaluation
or two sub-measures. Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the
meaning of each dimension and the associated sub-measures.
The five sub-measures quantifying the complexity
(Table 2) are introduced with the aid of the example in
Figure 1. The figure shows an excerpt of a hypothetical
procedure for the task of maintaining the water level of
Tank_1 less than 70%, and the associated system configu-
ration. 
Table 1. The TACOM Measure: Complexity Dimensions 
Complexity dimension Description Included sub-measures
TS (task scope)
Representing the breadth, extent, range, or general size of a
task being considered
• SSC (step size complexity)
• SIC (step information complexity)
TR (task structurability) Representing whether or not the sequence and the relationship
between subtasks are well structured
• AHC (abstraction hierarchy complexity)
• SLC (step logic complexity)
TU (task uncertainty) Representing the degree of predictability or confidence of a
task
EDC (engineering decision complexity)
Table 2. The TACOM Sub-measures
Complexity dimension Description 
SIC (step information complexity) Complexity due to the amount of information to be processed by human operators
Complexity caused by the number of actions to be conducted by human operators
Logical complexity originated from the sequences of actions to be followed by human
operators
Complexity resulted from the amount of domain knowledge to be considered and/or
required by human operators
Complexity varied with respect to the amount of cognitive resources to be used and/or
required by human operators, which is needed to establish an appropriate decision criterion
SSC (step size complexity)
SLC (step logic complexity)
AHC (abstraction hierarchy complexity)
EDC (engineering decision complexity)
Fig. 1. A hypothetical Procedure-guided Task – “Maintain the Water Level of Tank_1”
The essential elements to carry out the given task are
also provided in Figure 1. Concerning the required infor-
mation, operators need to know three elements: the water
level of Tank_1 and the control information for Valve_1
and Valve_4 (i.e. how to operate these valves). In addition,
operators have to maintain the level of Tank_1 by perform-
ing a prescribed task that is composed of five actions.
The first two sub-measures of Table 2 cover complexity
characterization related to the amount of information as
well as the number of actions.
The third sub-measure considers that the required
actions should be conducted according to specific paths
and sequences of actions, the logical organization of which
can contribute to the complexity of the tasks, as results
from “multiple path-goal connections” [18] or “path-goal
multiplicity” [19]. For example, as it can be seen from
Figure 1, there are four paths to accomplish this task. First,
if the water level is less than 70%, then there is no action
to be conducted. In addition, even if the water level is
greater than 70%, operators do not need to carry out any
action if it does not increase rapidly. On the other hand, if
the water level is greater than 70% and rapidly increasing,
then operators have to select one of two paths (i.e., strate-
gies): (a) increase outflow and (b) provide a bypass line.
To this end, it is natural to expect that operators need to
decide which path is more appropriate for a situation at
hand. The third sub-measure in Table 2 is introduced to
measure the logical complexity of a procedure-guided task. 
The above-mentioned sub-measures are not sufficient
for quantifying the complexity, because two significant
factors are not properly considered yet. The first one is the
amount of domain knowledge that is closely related to the
actual execution of a task being analyzed. For example,
let us compare three actions AT3, AT4 and AT5 shown in
Figure 1. Of them, since the targets of actions AT3 and
AT4 are dedicated components (i.e., Valve_1 and Valve_4), it
can be anticipated that operators do not need to recall and
/or extract additional domain knowledge (such as compo-
nent configuration) when they decide that the increase of
outflow from Tank_1 is the most effective strategy (i.e. they
decide for option a in the procedure). In contrast, the execu-
tion of the other strategy (i.e., “Provide bypass line”, option
b) requires additional domain knowledge such as “how
many bypass valves are connected to Tank_1?” Indeed, it
is possible that action descriptions without sufficient details
hamper the decision of an appropriate strategy or its execu-
tion. Accordingly, the fourth sub-measure of Table 2 meas-
ures the complexity of procedure-guided tasks in terms
of the amount of knowledge required to carry out the task. 
The last factor to be considered is the amount of cogni-
tive effort (or resources) to establish appropriate decision
criteria for performing required actions. For example, let
us consider action AT2 (i.e., “Determine water level of
Tank_1 is rapidly increasing”) in Figure 1. Judgment is
required to decide if the increase of the water level is rapid,
in lack of a specific criterion for determining a “rapid
increase”. Depending on the situation, this decision can be
more or less challenging and adds to the complexity of
the task. Accordingly, the last sub-measure is intended to
account for whether the task requires complex decisions. 
The TACOM score for a given procedure-guided task
is quantified by combining the values of the five sub-
measures (Figure 2). 
Figure 3 illustrates the whole process to quantify the
value of each sub-measure, for a procedural step connected
with the control of the pressurizer pressure – see Figure 3
for the task description [20]. Table 3 identifies the elements
entering in the calculation of the TACOM score. At first,
the required information necessary for accomplishing the
task is identified. For the specific example in Figure 3, this
corresponds to: (1) the value of the pressurizer pressure,
(2) process alarms for indicating the actuation of safety
injection (SI), and (3) those for containment isolation (CI).
Then the specific operator actions (and their sequence)
required to carry out the task need to be determined (AT1
to AT4 under step 2 in Figure 3). The calculation of the
TACOM score then requires to distinguish the level of
knowledge needed to carry out each action, from compo-
nent level up to process level, step 3 in Figure 3 (see also
levels in Table 3). For example, the action “Verify pres-
surizer pressure” requires system-level knowledge (the
pressurizer is a system that consists of two or more com-
ponents, e.g., the pressurizer heater and power operated
relief valves). Finally, the level of engineering decision
needs to be determined (depending on the cognitive effort
required by the decision, see Table 3). The present example
involves a simple comparison between the set point and the
reading of the pressurizer pressure, which corresponds to
the lowest level (i.e., ED-1 in Figure 3). 
When the identification of all the required information
and actions is completed, four graphs are constructed: (1)
an information structure graph that represents the required
154 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.2  APRIL 2013
PODOFILLINI et al., Measuring the Influence of Task Complexity on Human Error Probability: An Empirical Evaluation
Fig. 2. The TACOM Quantification Formula
information, (2) an action control graph that depicts the
required actions with their execution sequences, (3) an
abstraction hierarchy graph representing the system
knowledge that is necessary to accomplish the required
actions, and (4) an engineering decision graph denoting the
cognitive resources placed on operators. By using these
graphs, the values of five sub-measures are calculated by
the concept of the first and the second order graph entropy.
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Fig. 3. The Process to Quantify the TACOM Score
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Finally, the TACOM score can be quantified by the formula
given in Figure 2. More detailed explanations about the
quantification of sub-measures can be found in [7].
3. METHODOLOGY FOR THE EMPIRICAL
EVALUATION  
As explained in the previous Section 2, the TACOM
measure provides a quantitative index (a score) of the
complexity of procedure-guided tasks, based on a number
of objective elements (e.g., number of actions to be per-
formed, corresponding indications, decision criterion at
the basis of the procedural step, and the like). This is an
attractive property for HRA, for which the subjective PSF
evaluations are one of the reasons for the variability of the
HRA results as well as the difficulty of collecting data
for building and validating models, as discussed in the
introduction. In this regard, the purpose of the present
paper is to initially investigate the validity of the TACOM
measure in representing the task complexity issues relevant
to HRA models. Generally, a validity statement should
address: 
• Whether the TACOM definition covers task complex-
ity issues relevant to HRA models 
• Evidence that the TACOM score correlates with
human error probabilities
From these considerations, the TACOM measure is
applied to multiple emergency tasks of different complexity,
for which empirical evidence of the error probability is
available (albeit with large uncertainty), along with evidence
of the factors influencing it. Figure 4 gives an overview
of the present study. 
In particular, as depicted in Figure 4, the empirical
basis (to which TACOM scores should be compared) is
taken from the International HRA Empirical Study [2]. In
the context of the Empirical Study, a number of emergency
tasks were simulated, obtaining evidence on the error
probability and on the factors influencing the performance
on pre-determined Human Failure Events (HFEs) (Section
4 will present in detail the empirical data from [2] used for
the present study).  
Table 3. Elements Entering the TACOM Calculation 
Element Element type (1) Example
Boolean
Float
Inter
Array of {Boolean, Float, Integer}
Component 
System
Process
Abstraction
-
ED-1
ED-2
ED-3
ED-4
-
Alarm annunciation (yes / no)
Values of process variables
The number of available pumps
Multiple information required {Boolean, Float, Integer}
All kinds of distinctive valves, heaters and pumps, etc.
A boundary that contains two or more distinctive components
A boundary that contains two or more systems
A boundary that contains two or more processes
• AT1: Verify pressurizer pressure
• AT2: Verify the actuation of SI
AT2 should be followed by AT1
Simple decision with a clear criterion (e.g., “Verify pressurizer
pressure is less than 123.9kg/cm2”)
A decision based on the integration of lower-level information
(e.g., “Verify pressurizer pressure is decreasing”)
A decision to be drawn by the identification of a given
situation at hand based on process parameters, symptoms and
the associated knowledge (e.g., “Verify pressurizer pressure is
abnormally decreasing”)
A decision to select the most appropriate strategy among
several alternatives (e.g., “If necessary, perform any of the
following”)
The amount of information
required to carry out the action
The number of actions
The sequence of actions
Required knowledge type for
each action
(1) The calculation of the TACOM score of a task is based on the selection of the appropriate type, for each of the multi-type elements,
for each action constituting the task. 
Required decision type for
each action
As shown in Figure 4, two levels of comparison are
envisioned. The higher is at the overall complexity level
(note the present paper focuses on this level). As explained
in the previous Section 2, task complexity has multiple
dimensions (e.g., TS, TR, and TU), and the TACOM me-
asure provides an overall score aggregating these dimen-
sions. At the higher level, the comparison aims at evaluating
the TACOM measure as an overall complexity indicator.
The lower level of comparison (out of the scope of the
present paper) would address the definitions and values of
the five TACOM sub-measures.
The comparison at the overall complexity level ad-
dresses two aspects (Figure 4):
• The correlation between the actual TACOM scores
and the empirical HEPs of the considered HFEs.
• Whether the TACOM measure is able to provide a
difficulty characterization coherent with the qualitative
characterization as a result of the empirical evidence
(in other words, the ability to discriminate between,
e.g., “easy” and “difficult” tasks). 
Concerning the first aspect, due to the limited number
of HFEs available for the present study and to the large
uncertainties associated with their (empirical) probability
values, the comparison is not based on the calculation of
statistical indices such as the correlation coefficient. Rather,
a qualitative discussion of the TACOM-HEP trend was
considered more appropriate (see Section 5). Due to this
limitation, the second aspect above (qualitative charac-
terization) becomes necessary. Along with the empirical
HEPs, a piece of evidence from the HRA Empirical Study
is the general characterization of the difficulty of each task.
This comes in the form of a qualitative judgment (e.g.,
“easy”, “difficult”, “very difficult”) supported by a de-
scription of the operational difficulties connected with the
task. The qualitative judgment is determined in [2] aggre-
gating information both quantitative (e.g., the observed
failures) as well as qualitative (e.g., possible operational
difficulties observed that may not result in task failure).
Due to the large uncertainty bounds for some of the HFEs
considered, it is important to analyze how TACOM scores
discriminate between the different difficulty categories,
which, in turn, relates to different levels of error probability. 
157NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.2  APRIL 2013
PODOFILLINI et al., Measuring the Influence of Task Complexity on Human Error Probability: An Empirical Evaluation
Fig. 4. Overview of the Present Study and Relationship with the International HRA Empirical Study
An important element to be considered in this study
is the selection of the HFEs. The crew performance in the
nine HFEs of the HRA Empirical Study [2] was not solely
influenced by factors related to the task complexity (as
measured by the TACOM measure). Other factors, both
scenario-related (e.g., clarity of indications, time available
to perform task) and crew-related (e.g., stress, work pro-
cesses, communication), played important roles. From
the point of view of the purpose of the present study, it is
important to select HFEs for which the crew performance
(and the error probability) is driven by complexity-related
factors. For example, HFEs driven by other factors (e.g.,
clarity of indications) are not relevant because they are out
of the scope of the TACOM measure. Another difficulty is
that PSFs are interdependent, so that as one factor changes
(e.g., as more complex tasks are considered) others change
as well (e.g., stress increases, familiarity with the task
decreases). As discussed in more detail in Section 4, in
the present study, it is made sure that the task complexity
is the main factor of primary influence.
As stated above, two levels of comparison are envi-
sioned (Figure 4), with the second level related to the
TACOM sub-measures. The sub-measures relate to the
specific influences that determine the task complexity (e.g.,
number of actions involved, amount of information required,
and amount of engineering knowledge required, etc.), and
depending on the task, they contribute differently to the final
TACOM score (Figure 3). Indeed, an important aspect to
investigate is whether these differences in sub-measure
contributions match the operational difficulties observed
for the HFEs. These are reflected in the empirical PSF
evaluations and descriptions of operational crew behaviors
in the various tasks, derived in [2]. For example, observed
crew difficulties due to the need to follow multiple param-
eters at the same time should be represented by a higher
contribution of the sub-measure SIC, related to the amount
of information to be processed to carry out the task (Table
1). This level of comparison provides information on the
completeness of the TACOM definition (each of the task
complexity issues emerging in the different HFEs should
be represented by any of the TACOM sub-measures) as
well as on the physical meaning of TACOM sub-measures.
This investigation will be the subject of future work.  
4. THE EMPIRICAL DATA (INTERNATIONAL HRA
EMPIRICAL STUDY)
The data used for the empirical evaluation presented in
this paper are taken from the International HRA Empirical
study, which investigated the performance, strengths, and
weaknesses of different HRA methods [1, 2]. In the HRA
Empirical Study, predefined emergency tasks carried out
by operating crews in nuclear power plants were analyzed
by different HRA teams using different HRA methods.
These analyses were compared with empirical results ob-
tained from experiments performed at the Halden Reactor
Project HAMMLAB (HAlden huMan-Machine LABoratory)
research simulator, with real crews (14 crews participated).
The data was collected and interpreted by HAMMLAB
experimentalists. A group of experts compared the perfor-
mance data to the HRA predictions. 
The data from the HRA Empirical Study relevant to
the present paper consists of (for each analyzed HFE):
1. Difficulty ranking and qualitative difficulty charac-
terization (e.g., “easy”, “difficult”, see Table 4).
2. Empirical HEPs. These were obtained from Bayesian
update of a minimally informed prior (lognormal
distribution with 1.2E-4 and 0.3 for the 5th and 95th
percentiles, respectively) based on the number of
failing crews out of the 14 crews.
3. PSF ratings. The empirical data was processed to
determine the influences that each of the factors had
on crew performance. The following ratings were
used:
a. MND = Main negative driver
b. ND = Negative driver
c.  0 = Not a driver
d. N/P = Nominal/Positive driver.
Note that the development of the methodology to collect,
interpret, and aggregate the raw data from the 14 crews
(e.g., simulator logs, videos, operator interviews) into the
above data form (difficulty ranking and characterization,
empirical HEPs, PSF rating) was an important achievement
of the HRA Empirical Study [1]. The description of this
methodology is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Table 4 gives an overview of the empirical data used
for the present study. The HRA Empirical Study addressed
9 HFEs, corresponding to a set of predetermined tasks on
two variants (a “base case” and a “complex” one involving
multiple additional failures challenging the crew response)
of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) accident
scenario. The HFEs (and the corresponding success criteria)
were defined based on the main crew tasks in response to
SGTR events: 
• HFE-1A and HFE-1B, identify and isolate the SGTR
(base and complex case, respectively)
• HFE-2A and HFE-2B, cool down the reactor coolant
system (base and complex case, respectively)    
• HFE-3A and HFE-3B, depressurize the reactor coolant
system (base and complex case, respectively)    
• HFE-4A, terminate safety injection (only base case)
• HFE-5B1, Close Power Operated Relief Valve
(PORV) – PORV indicator shows closed (only com-
plex case); HFE-5B2, Close PORV – PORV indicator
shows open (only complex case).
Of the above HFEs, five HFEs (HFE-2A, HFE-2B,
HFE-3A, HFE-3B, and HFE-4A) were selected for the
present study on the basis of the negative drivers identified
from the Empirical Study: the HFEs for which task com-
plexity issues resulted as negative drivers of the operator
performance. To this purpose, Table 5 identifies which
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Table 4. The Empirical Data for the Present Study: HFE Difficulty Ranking and PSFs Evaluations from the HRA Empirical Study 
PSF (4)
Difficulty categorization 
(1) ‘A’ and ‘B’ in HFE identifiers refer to HFEs from the base case and complex SGTR scenarios, respectively
(2) MND = Main negative driver (i.e., the larger effect on the performance of the HFE or the factor that caused the other PSFs to
assume non-nominal, non-zero values)
ND = Negative driver
Blank = “not a driver” or “Nominal/Positive driver”
(3)  HFE-5B1 is addressed to show the effect of considering HFEs driven by factors out of the scope of the TACOM measure (indication
of conditions in this case).
(4)  In gray, factors within the scope of the TACOM measure
Very difficult Somewhat
difficult
Somewhat
difficult
Easy to
somewhat
difficult 
Easy to
somewhat
difficult 
Very Easy
HFE-5B1(3) HFE-3B HFE-3A HFE-2A HFE-2B HFE-4A
PSF evaluations for the Human failure events (HFEs) (1), (2)
Time pressure 
Stress 
Scenario complexity 
Indication of conditions 
Execution complexity 
Training 
Experience 
Procedural guidance 
HMI 
Work processes 
Communication 
Team dynamics 
MND
MND
ND
ND 
ND
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
MND
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
ND 
MND
Table 5. Identification of TACOM-related PSFs (from Definitions Adopted in the International HRA Empirical Study)
Factor Working definition in the International HRA Empirical Study Association with TACOM sub-measures
• SSC (Complexity caused by the number of
actions to be conducted by human operators)
• SIC (Complexity due to the amount of
information to be processed by human
operators)
Execution
Complexity
Execution complexity captures the difficulty of performance
(implementation) of the task (not including situation assessment,
diagnosis, etc). Execution complexity is influenced by the number
of steps to be performed, whether the task is associated with a
single variable or with multiple variables, and whether special
sequencing or coordination of multiple performers is required.
• EDC (Complexity varied with respect to the
amount of cognitive resources to be used
and/or required by human operators, which
is needed to establish an appropriate decision
criterion)
Scenario
Complexity
Scenario complexity is the difficulty of situation assessment and
diagnosis. It is related to “masking,” diagnosis complexity, the
need to decipher numerous indications and alarms, and the
ambiguity associated with assessing the situation. In many PSF
frameworks, this factor relates to the indications of conditions
(availability of cues, ease of perceiving these cues, or the difficulty
of interpreting these indications).
• SLC (Logical complexity originated from
the sequences of actions to be followed by
human operators)
• AHC (Complexity resulted from the amount
of domain knowledge to be considered
and/or required by human operators)
Procedural
Guidance
Procedural guidance refers to the support provided by the
procedure for performing the situation assessment (decision
making) and execution of the specific task being analyzed. In the
context of the scenario of interest, steps that are ambiguous,
unclear, or not detailed, and situations where the procedure is
unclear, can contribute to a poor rating for this factor.
Empirical Study PSFs can be associated with the TACOM
measure. For example, the definition of “Execution com-
plexity” (as adopted in [1]) designates several attributes
(such as the number of steps to be performed or the amount
of variables) within the scope of the TACOM measure.
Then, execution complexity issues are covered by sub-
measures SSC and SIC, because they quantify the com-
plexity of procedure-guided tasks based on the number of
actions and the amount of information to be processed,
respectively. Similarly, “scenario complexity”, covering
decision-making activities (such as situation assessment
and diagnosis) can be associated with the elements of
sub-measure EDC. Note that the associations in Table 5
are not crisp: some PSF elements can be associated with
different sub-measures as well; Table 5 only highlights
the most evident associations. 
As shown by Table 4, the performance in the five
selected tasks is not solely driven by the complexity-related
factors (execution complexity, scenario complexity, and
procedural guidance). In particular, the factors of “stress”,
“team dynamics”, and “work processes” also played a role
in some of these HFEs. Indeed, as explained in Section 3,
the influencing factors are interdependent so that in general
they cannot be changed one at a time: as the task changes,
the influences of the other factors may change as well. In
particular, this occurs for the observed negative influences
of “stress” and “team dynamics”; as the task complexity
characteristics change, the observed effect of “stress” and
“team dynamics” are different. What is important is that
task complexity-related factors of relevance for the
TACOM measure are those driving the operator perfor-
mance in the different HFEs (and therefore responsible
for the HEP changes). Indeed, the same crews perform
across all tasks so that crew-specific elements influencing
crew PSFs (“stress”, “team dynamics”, and “work
processes”) do not change across HFEs.
5. RESULTS 
Table 6 presents the empirical results and the associated
TACOM scores for each of the considered HFEs, charac-
terized by task complexity-related dominant drivers (PSFs:
scenario and execution complexity, and procedural guidance). 
Table 6 shows that the variation of the TACOM scores
generally reflects that of the difficulty characterization
(except for the case of HFE-3A) – this trend is also visible
in Figure 5. For example, the difficulty characterization
and the associated TACOM score of HFE-4A are “very
easy” and 3.4, respectively. Those of HFE-2B are “easy to
somewhat difficult” and 4.0. The TACOM score of HFE-
3B is 4.7, and the difficulty is characterized as “somewhat
difficult”. The TACOM scores increase with the empirical
task difficulty and appear well differentiated according to
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Table 6. TACOM vs. Empirical Results: Difficulty Characterization, Drivers, and HEPs
HFE Difficulty
characterization TACOM-related Other UB LB
Negative driver (PSF) Empirical HEP (1)
TACOM
Empirical Results
3B
Somewhat difficult • Scenario
complexity
• Execution
complexity
• Stress
• Team dynamics
3.0E-1 1.8E-2 4.7
3A Somewhat difficult • Execution
complexity
• Stress
• Team dynamics 1.8E-1 3.0E-3 4.1
2A Easy to somewhat
difficult
• Scenario
complexity
• Execution
complexity
• Procedural
guidance
• Team dynamics
1.8E-1 3.0E-3 4.2
2B Easy to somewhat
difficult
• Scenario
complexity
• Execution
complexity
• Stress
• Team dynamics
5.0E-2 9.0E-5 4.0
4A Very easy
(1) UB and LB: upper bound and lower bound of the Bayesian HEP estimate, respectively [2].
- - 5.0E-2 9.0E-5 3.4
the different difficulty characterizations (except for the
case of HFE-3A). 
As noted, the TACOM score seems to under-estimate
the difficulty of HFE-3A (Figure 5). The difficulty charac-
terization of this HFE is “somewhat difficult”, but its
TACOM score is 4.1, in practice coincident with that of
HFE-2A and HFE-2B (“easy to somewhat difficult”). A
possible explanation of this mismatch can be that the effect
of the other drivers (i.e., stress and team dynamics PSFs,
out of the scope of the TACOM measure) is more significant
on HFE-3A than on HFE-2A and HFE-2B; accordingly, the
TACOM score (which is limited to treating task-complexity
issues) does not properly represent the difference between
HFE-3A and HFE-2A/HFE-2B. This aspect will be further
clarified with the discussion of HFE-5B1.
Figure 6 compares the TACOM scores with the (empiri-
cal) error probabilities – empirical lower and upper bounds
shown. The generally increasing trend (for HFE-4A/2B/
161NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.2  APRIL 2013
PODOFILLINI et al., Measuring the Influence of Task Complexity on Human Error Probability: An Empirical Evaluation
Fig. 5. Difficulty Characterization and the TACOM Score  
(Ellipses Indicate that Characterization Should be Indented as a Range, Not a Point Value)
Fig. 6. Empirical HEP and the TACOM Score
3A/2A/3B) of the TACOM scores as the (empirical) error
probability increases is confirmed. The trend in Figure 6
is monotonically increasing in the HEP bounds and does
not show a peak in HFE-3A (suggesting underestimation
by the TACOM score) as it could be expected from Figure 5.
The reason is that, as stated in Section 4, the qualitative
judgment on task difficulty from [2] is not only based on
the observed failure counts, but also aggregates qualitative
observations (e.g., possible operational difficulties observed
that may not result in task failure). Indeed, HFE-2B and
HFE-4A are associated different difficulty characterization
(“very easy” for HFE-4A and “easy to somewhat difficult”
for HFE-2B), although the empirical error bounds are the
same (Figure 6). Similarly, HFE-3A and HFE-2A are
characterized as “somewhat difficult” and “easy to some-
what difficult”, but the error bounds are equal. The mono-
tonic trend of Figure 6 as opposed to Figure 5 should not
lead to the conclusion that the TACOM measure is generally
representing better the error probability (Figure 6) com-
pared to the difficulty characterization (Figure 5). Indeed,
the information content behind the qualitative characteri-
zation is richer than for the empirical HEPs: the uncertainty
in the empirical HEPs is quite large and the difference
between HFE-4A/2B and HFE-3A/2A is just of one failure
count (zero failures observed for HFE-4A/2B, one failure
observed for HFE-3A/2A). The conclusion from both
Figure 5 and 6 should be that of a generally visible increas-
ing trend of the TACOM as the error probability increases
(determined based on failure counts as well as supplement-
ing failure counts with qualitative information).
The aspect of the mismatch within the complexity
characterization of HFE-3A can be further clarified if we
consider HFE-5B1 with difficulty characterization, associ-
ated TACOM score, upper and lower bound of empirical
HEP of: “very difficult,” 3.6, 0.98 and 0.43, respectively.
As shown in Table 4, the dominant drivers of HFE-5B1
are: (1) scenario complexity, (2) indication of conditions,
and (3) work processes. Although one of the dominant
drivers is the scenario complexity (therefore within the scope
of the TACOM measure), the TACOM score strongly under-
estimates the difficulty of this HFE, as shown in Figure 6. 
Indeed, all of the crews failed to accomplish HFE-
5B1 because of the degraded indication information that
corresponds to the PSF indication of conditions [2]. In
particular, success in this HFE required indications that
were not available within the timeframe defined as success
criterion (which would become visible afterward). The
TACOM score does not consider the effect of missing or
degraded indications (Figure 3), so that the difficulties
associated with HFE-5B1 are clearly not within its scope.
Correspondingly, the TACOM score of 3.6 for HFE-5B1
is close to that of the “very easy” HFE-4A.
As mentioned in Section 3, further investigation of
the relationship between the specific performance drivers
and the definitions and values of the TACOM sub-measures
is foreseen as future activity. This is expected to shed
additional light on the specific contributions of each of the
TACOM inputs to the sub-measures and of each of the
sub-measures to the overall score.  
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper has presented an empirical evaluation of
the TACOM measure as an indicator of the task complexity
issues relevant to HRA. The TACOM measure is attractive
for HRA because it is defined on objective elements (e.g.,
number of tasks to be performed, amount of information
required and logic structure of the task performance paths,
etc.). The adoption of the TACOM measure to represent
task complexity issues in an HRA model (e.g., to measure
a task complexity PSF) would allow less subjectivity in the
evaluation of this factor when applying an HRA method
as well as when collecting HRA data
The empirical evaluation (on five human failure events
selected from those addressed in the HRA Empirical Study)
has shown promising results. The TACOM score increases
as the empirical HEP of the selected HFEs increases. These
HFEs were selected based on whether their error probability
(from the empirical evidence) was driven by issues that
could be related to any of the TACOM sub-measures. This
strongly supports that the TACOM measure is representative
of the performance issues driving the difficulty of the
considered tasks, and quantitatively suggests a relationship
between TACOM scores and the error probability. Except
for one case, the relative differences in the TACOM scores
are coherent with the (qualitative) difficulty characterization
from the empirical results: TACOM scores are well distin-
guished if related to different categories (e.g., “easy” vs.
“somewhat difficult”), while values corresponding to tasks
within the same category are very close.
Some limitations of the present study need to be under-
scored. The limited number of HFEs considered in the study
and the large uncertainties in their failure probabilities do
not allow obtaining conclusive results on the evaluation
of the TACOM measure as task complexity measure for
HRA purposes. In addition, the TACOM-HEP relationship
should be investigated also on different profiles of the
other PSFs (in which task complexity issues are not the
primary performance drivers), so that the interdependence
between TACOM scores and the other PSFs would also
be accounted for. As mentioned in the present paper, an
important next step is the evaluation of the TACOM sub-
measures: these relate to specific influences on the task
complexity, contributing with different weights to the
TACOM measure. These sub-measure contributions need
to be evaluated in light of the operational difficulties
observed in the different HFEs, providing information on
the completeness of the TACOM definition (each of the
task complexity issues emerging in the different HFEs
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should be represented by any of the TACOM sub-measures)
as well as on the relative weights with which the sub-
measures enter in the TACOM formula.
Despite the limitations, this paper has presented one
of few attempts to empirically study the effect of a perfor-
mance shaping factor on the human error probability.
Typically, the effect of these factors is studied on operator
performance measures (e.g., time to complete the task or,
providing a more complete characterization, workload or
situation awareness indications); but for HRA applications
the link to the human error probability needs to be addressed.
These types of studies are important to enhance the empirical
basis of HRA methods, to make sure that the definitions
of the PSFs cover the influences important for HRA (i.e.
influencing the error probability) and that the quantitative
relationships among PSFs and error probabilities are ade-
quately represented. However, a prerequisite for these
studies is a better definition (to the extent possible objective
and supported by detailed guidance) of the PSFs, toward
the establishment of a direct link between collected data
and the associated PSFs ratings. The TACOM measure
has shown promising features in this respect.  
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